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I feel compelled to respond to Eugene D. Tate and Kathleen McCon- 
nellls (1985) "Afterword and Comment" to the Canadian Journal of Can- 
nunication's 1985 "Special Issue on Teaching Critical Cc~mmunicatim 
Studies." Tate and McCcrnnell misuse the work of Eugen Rosenstock- 
Huessy, misunderstand the problem of curriculum develcpment, ard miss 
altogether the validity and significance of Marx inspired criticism of 
"human communication" as both historical artifact and discipline of 
theoretical inquiry . 
1. In "despairing" (why must our intellectual differences lead 
to psychopathological states?) that Professors Jhally, Saunders, Straw, 
and Mosco [see the Canadian Journal of Cmmunication, 1985, 1 1  (111 
have written about what they teach rather than how they teach, E t e  and 
McConnell insinuatext all discussions of whaFTas traditionally been 
called "curriculum" (Hass, 1980, 4) are invalid. This attempt to call 
intellectual "fouls" over such a vast, on-going, and certifiably useful 
endeavor seems self evidently absurd. That many universities offer 
graduate-level degrees in "Curriculum and Instruction" strongly implies 
that though "content" and "method" mu~ultimately be joined they are 
(1) analytically separable (even when the method is the message), and 
(2) that a choice of content does not prescribe a method of instruction 
or that a choice of method does not (except in the most extreme cases) 
necessarily control educational content. To crudely elide much cf what 
has constituted educational thought in the name of "andragogy" or 
"learner centered problem solving techniques" (which here stands unsup- 
ported except by derisive sarcasm directed at those who would turn 
students into "ideological groupies" and which, on first glance, seems 
suspect of being solipsistic and neo-Platonic as well as ahistorical 
and apolitical ) certainly cannot be justified by citing a series of 
scholar/teachers who have translated particular contents into simula- 
tions and other problem-solving formats or whc have devised simula- 
tions, etc. and later found them to be educationally useful. 
2. Tate and McConnell (especially page 128) equivocate on the 
crucial term "critical perspective ." Most of the authors Tate and 
McConnell criticize use the term "critical" to mean an elaborate, 
materialist analysis of culture as a product of economic relationships 
and the ideate structures which justify those relafionships (or hide 
them) and manage the contradictions which inevitably arise in them. 
Tate and McConnell, on the other hand, use "critical" to mean vulgar 
intellectual individualism usually associated with a knowledge of clas- 
sical conceptions of relevance and validity and a higher than normal 
degree of general skepticism. In both usages of "critical" the claim 
is made that criticism can "liberate" learners and develop in them 
greater than usual self -knowleege. These claim: deserve systematic 
attention, not editorial confusion. 
3. The "empirical" studies on the limited functions of the 
"lecture" cited by Tate and McConnell are exemplary social scientific 
nonsense. Charles Gruner has found in no fewer than sewn studies, 
confining the work of still other social~scientists, that humcr does 
not make a message more merr.orable or persuasive, or its source more 
credible (see as but one example Gruner and Lampton, 1972). And yet we 
know a comedian like Dick Gregory can take an audience fran shrieking 
laughter to tears of empathy in a moment and that Johnny Carson on the 
"Tonight Show" fran 1977 to 1980 belittl~d U. S, President Jimmy Carter 
and his family to the point where one could not continue to laugh with 
Carson and at the same t i m  believe Carter was fit to govern. In the 
same way we know that there are some extra-ordinary lecturers (arguably 
the very best teachers of all) (Rubin, 1984) who dramatically strength- 
en students' critical abilities (by any definition). To assert that 
this is not so is to do violence to what fcr many of us has been a 
fruitful experience as lecturer and 1 istener. 
4. The people Tate and McConnell criticize fcr not being dialec- 
tical or interactive enough in their educational methods are inevitably 
diclectical and interactive according to the very communication theo- 
rists they cite and praise. Human relationships -- classroom rela- 
tionships being one example -- are by definition and experience inter- 
active phenomena. Perhaps they should be mcre reflexively interactive; 
that is, that the participants ought more self-consciously attend to 
the interaction which is taking place and the relationship which is 
being constructed. Many passages frcm Martin Buber and a few from 
Rosenstock-Huessy (including the latter's slogan, "I respond although I 
will be changed") night be cited to support this somewhat attractive 
pcsition; but this would be a distortion of the work of both of these 
thinkers, an unnecessary limitation and an emptyircg out of what was for 
both the vital material agenda into the consciousness of the moment. 
5. I, for one, infer fran reading this "Special Issue" that the 
scholars under the cloud of despair in Tate and McConnellls comments 
really are sensitive to their students and profoundly "dialectical" in 
their approach to the classroom, albeit the dialectic of economic 
class. It is a grave error to p~tshct and seccnd Guess the neo-Marxian 
critical theorists of human communication: though they are not all 
equally advanced in their analysis or talented in articulating their 
ideas, they are working ir, a complex and systematic way which can only 
be mderstood and effectively criticized fran the inside. More impor- 
tant still is the role these critical theorists play in academic life 
today. Rosenstock-Huessy himself once remarked (Martin, 1982), perhaps 
offhandedly, at the height of the Spanish Civil War that the "Commu- 
nists are the only true Christians today." And so it is in the 1980's 
that the Marx-influenced thinkers are doing the best job of giving all 
the rest of us in higher education a way to say that when we look out 
on these bright, smiling faces in our classrooms we are in a very real 
sense not nearly so much developing human potential as fattening a 
class, not so much liberating as being linked by these 1 ives to the 
industries of mayhem, repression, and social isolation. 
6. The work of Eugen Rc:senstock-Huessy does not authorize the 
attacks of Tate and McConnell on the lecture. Many of the works of  
Rosenstock-Huessy come down to us in the form of transcribed and scrip- 
ted lectures. Entire lecture courses that Rosenstc;ck-Huessy gave at 
Dartmouth College are available for sale on audio cassette tape. 
Stories (legends) of Rcsenstock-Huessy in the classroom make him out to 
have been something of a tyrant (though a loveable, forgiving, and 
apclogetic tyrant). Rcsenstock-Huessy stressed in all of his educa- 
tional writings the necessity for authority, real authority predicated 
on relevant experience and genuine risk, in the classroan (Rosenstcxk- 
Huessy, 1970a, 1981a) and the absolute necessity of the elder genera- 
tion teaching the younger generation with vigor and by example (Rcsen- 
stcck-Huessy, 1970b, 1981b). Eugene Tate well knows that when the 
definitive dissertation is written on the educational thought of Rosen- 
stock-Huessy it will scarcely treat the issue of lecture versus discus- 
sion (or simulation, etc.) and will focus instead on the expansion of 
education to adults and community settings, the education of people of 
different class backgrounds together, public service as an educational 
issue, education for complete communicative canpetence by in the tempo- 
ral ization of epistemology, the importance of schooling , and the 
school's transformation of the calendar. 
7. It is plainly false to say that Rosenstock-Huessy, Rosen- 
zweig, art Euber are the "only" seninal Twentieth-Century thirikers to 
criticize Aristotel ianlcartesian assumptions (Tate and McConnell , 1985, 
126), nor would it be appropriate to say that all such criticism origi- 
nates with them. Indeed, it is not at all evident why Aristotle and 
Descartes were linked in this way, nc:t even slightly evident why Des- 
cartes and Aristotle (especially Aristotle who has so often renewed the 
rhetorical tradition in communication studies) must perish that we may 
think aright. In point of indisputable fact, almost every major figure 
in the so-called existential-phenomenological movement in philosophy 
and psychology has savaged traditional rationalism and "positivism ," 
attacked Descartes by narre, and enerbetically worked over the subject 
/object split. (See as but a few examples: Husserl, 1962, 91 - 132; 
Jaspers, 1955, 1964, 171 - 185; Gusdorf, 1965, 19 - 33; Scheler, 1958, 
84; Sartre, 1956; Ortega, 1933, 29 - 35; Berdyaev, 1938, 10 - 14.) 
Other intellectual traditions have made additional criticisms. In the 
"rhetcrical studies" tradition of communication research in the United 
States, while Aristotle remains influential, Chaim Perelman's "new 
rhetoric" which begins on the very first page with an attack on Descar- 
tes is widely respected (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, 1 - 62); 
in the line of scholarship Kenneth Burke's motion/acticn distinction is 
widely emplcyed to restore to the human sciences what Cartesian posi- 
tivism is thought to omit. The greatest shortcoming of the secondary 
studies on Rosenstc!&-Huessy is a preoccupation with and hence exagge- 
raticn of the novelty and precedence of his thought. It is both more 
modest and truer to say as Walter Ong, S.J. did (1960, 139), "It would 
seem inaccurate to view [Rosenstock-Huessy'sl work as resulting from 
the 'influence' of Heidegger, Jaspers, Lavelle, Marcel, Denis de Rouge- 
mont, or even Buber and Franz Rosenzweig. He breathed the same air as 
these men, sensed many of the same questions; but one feels that he has 
made his own distinctive contributions to the climate of ideas." 
Rosenstock-.Puessy was an original think@r of great force and range, but 
kis work in epistemology, discourse typologies, the theory of revolu- 
ticn, and social change strategy cannot be divorced from the mainstream 
of Twentieth Century thought. 
8. The Tate and McConnell essay reads as an exercise in 
squeamisheness about dread Marxism. RcsenstoCk-Huessy would authorize 
these misgivings, though not in this tepid/equivocal retreat to a 
patertly subjective andragogy . Rosenstock-Huessy would boldly set 
against Marxism the even more complex Christianity (though his own 
idiosyncratic version) to show that Marxism is a Christian heresy and 
like all heresies both robust with the truth and teetering on barbar- 
ism, devoid of the principle of paradox and the centering doctrine of 
human fragility. With Christ as the central critical figure, Rosen- 
stock -Huessy stands over every complacent capitalist and every frivo- 
lous Marxist revolutionary, challenging both the arrogance of privilege 
and the arrogance of the dispensability of social order. Of course 
these are terms which are foreign tc contemporary academic discussion, 
but if Rosenstock-Huessy 's is an example of the examined 1 ife at a1 1 ,  
it is of finding profundity in unpopular positions and having the 
courage to express these positions. In these terms, the real Posen- 
stock-Husseyian response to neo-Marxist educational thcught is yet to 
be written . 
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